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Abstract
The law relating to contractual interpretation in England and Wales is leaning increasingly
towards a context-based approach. Despite this, pre-contractual negotiations are generally inad-
missible as an aid to interpretation. This somewhat anomalous situation has drawn criticism from
many commentators. Recently in Chartbrook Ltd. v. Persimmon Homes Ltd., the House of
Lords again endorsed the status quo, seeing no reason to depart from tradition. This paper argues
that this stance is incompatible not only with the contextual paradigm but also with the approach
adopted in other jurisdictions, and needs to be modernized. Further, as domestic courts at lower
levels are already admitting such evidence in various circumstances, this paper argues that the
courts should remove the rule because it inhibits their ability to do this clearly, efficiently, and
fairly. Courts can deal with any concerns about cost and delay by effectively using the Civil Proce-
dure Rules of 1998.
I. Introduction
Disputes about the meaning of express contractual provisions furnish one of the main
sources of contemporary contractual litigation.' In the effort to interpret these provisions,
English law tends to exclude pre-contractual negotiations from consideration in spite of
an otherwise increasingly context-based approach to contractual interpretation. 2 Views as
to whether this is the most conducive approach to take have remained divergent. While
some jurists and commentators are firmly of the view that courts should never consider
extrinsic evidence when construing contracts, others espouse a different perspective on the
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1. Alan Schwartz & Robert Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 928 (2010); MINDY
CHEN-WISHART, CONTRACT LAW 440 (3rd ed. 2010); V. K. Rajah, Redrawing the Boundaries of Con-
tractual Interpretation: From Text to Context to Pre-text and Beyond, 22 SING. ACAD. LJ. 513, 513 (2010).
2. See discussion infra Section II.
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matter. The House of Lords3 steadfastly defended the status quo when the opportunity
for debate was reopened recently by the case Chartbrook Ltd. v. Persimmon Homes Ltd.4
This unfortunate stance on the practice in England and Wales needs to be brought in line
with the practices in Europe and other major jurisdictions in the world to bring England
and Wales in line with commercial reality in the Twenty-First Century.
Section II looks closer at the range of opinions on the issue of contract interpretation.
It discusses the reasoning underlying the positions taken by the traditionalists and the
reformists. Section III reviews the Chartbrook case and considers the House of Lords'
arguments for the rule's preservation. It focuses on the lead judgment delivered by Lord
Hoffmann, asking what it is about the principle that merits retention in England and
Wales but not in Continental Europe or international treaties. In addition, Section m
highlights the extent to which Lord Hoffman's view of extrinsic evidence derives from his
general posture on certainty, discernible in his previous cases.5 In contrast to this theoret-
ical inflexibility, this paper highlights situations where courts in England, Wales, and else-
where are already making inroads into the exclusionary rule, using this trend as context to
argue why the courts should give explicit recognition to an otherwise prevalent practice.
Section IV highlights the need for greater emphasis on the significance of approaching
each set of circumstances differently in lieu of a uniform, blanket exclusion. Finally, atten-
tion is drawn to circumstances where the exclusionary rule can be waived or excepted.
Section V concludes the discussion.
H. The Exclusionary Rule
With the exception of standard form contracts and simple transactions, contracts can be
preceded by lengthy and complex negotiations. Contracting parties, despite their utmost
efforts at drafting, are sometimes not able to achieve the precision that would insulate
them from ensuing conflicts over the meaning of the words used in their contracts. Occa-
sionally, disputes that arise from diverging interpretations result in litigation. A court's
task when called to adjudicate the dispute is to ascertain the common intention of the
parties by using the contract language.6 English law does not seek to identify what the
3. Formerly the highest appellate court in England and Wales, the House of Lords was replaced in this
capacity by the U.K. Supreme Court on October 1, 2009. See U.K. Supreme Court Website, http://
www.supremecourt.gov.uk/about/the-supreme-court.html (last visited May 15, 2011).
4. Chartbrook Ltd. v. Persimmon Homes Ltd., [20091 UKHL 38, [2009] 1 A.C. 1101 (appeal taken from
Eng.) (U.K.).
5. His Lordship's position in this case, compared with his views elsewhere, especially in Investors Comp.
Scheme Ltd. v. W. Bromwich Bldg. Soc'y (ICS), [1998] 1 W.L.R. 896 (H.L.) (U.K.), and in Pepper v. Hart,
[1993] 1 A.C. 593 (H.L.) (U.K.), offers interesting material for analysis in legal theory, particularly in Duncan
Kennedy's "indeterminacy" mode or Terry Eagleton's "self-consciousness or self-reflectiveness" by adjudica-
tors. See generally DUNCAN KINNi)Y, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997); TERRY FRANcis EAGLETON,
THE IDEOLOGY OF TiHE AEFS-TEric (1990); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND TH E MODERN MIND (1930); AMERI-
CAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher ill et al. eds.) (1993). It can be argued at one level, as we have done
in this article, that he was being consistent. At another level, it can be contended that he reflected on his
decision in ICS and the hints he gave of the need to review the exclusionary rule, and decided he needed to
rein in any excessive exuberance. For a more nuanced model, see Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski &
Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1 (2007).
6. Christopher Staughton, How Do the Courts Interpret Commercial Contracts?, 58 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 303, 304
(1999).
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parties actually intended by the words they have used or the meaning as understood by the
hearer or reader.7 Rather, the goal is to ascertain what a reasonable person, in the posi-
tion of the parties, would understand as the intended meaning of the words.8 To identify
this objective meaning, Lord Wilberforce sitting in the House of Lords in the 1971 case
Prenn v. Simmonds,9 stressed that a court, as the embodiment of the reasonable person,
needs to situate itself in the same factual matrix as that of the parties at the time of the
contract.10 The House gave a ringing endorsement of this contextual stance in both Inves-
tors Compensation Scheme Ltd. v. West Bromwich Building Society (ICS)1I and Bank of Credit
and Commerce International SA (In Liquidation) v. Ali (No. 1).12 In both cases, Lord Hoff-
mann explained that although courts should extend the matrix of fact to include "abso-
lutely anything which would have affected the way in which the language of the document
would have been understood by a reasonable man," 3 the term "absolutely anything" re-
fers only to anything that the reasonable person would regard as relevant.14
Thus, because the relevance of the evidence to the objective setting of the contract
determines its admissibility,' 5 courts have ruled that they cannot consider the parties'
prior negotiations when construing contracts.' 6 Prior negotiations are admitted and used
"only in an action for rectification."' 7 The logic behind this so-called "exclusionary rule"
is that if actual intention is irrelevant in contract interpretation, "pre-contract negotiations
as a revelation of actual intention must likewise be equally irrelevant,"'8 lest they under-
mine the objective basis of the interpretation exercise.19 Further, the evidence of earlier
exchanges has been depicted as unhelpful since the parties' positions are continually
changing until the final decision is made. 20 These exchanges therefore do not convey the
common intention of the parties when they make the contract. 21 Only the final document
records a consensus, so courts should confine admissible evidence to the factual back-
ground known to the parties at the date of contract. 22
7. MICHAEL FURMSTON, CHESHIRE, FIFOor AND FURMSTON's LAW OF CONTRACT 158 (15th ed.
2007).
8. Donald Nicholls, My Kingdom for a Horse: The Meaning of Words, 121 L.Q. Rrv. 577, 579 (2005).
9. Prenn v. Simmonds, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1381, 1383-84 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K).
10. He later re-emphasized this view in Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. Yngvar Hansen-Tangen, 11976] 1
W.L.R. 989, 995-97 (H.L.) (U.K.).
11. Investors Comp. Scheme Ltd. v. W. Bromwich Bldg. Soc'y (ICS), [1998] 1 W.L.R. 896 (H.L.) (U.K.).
12. Bank of Credit & Commerce Int'l SA v. Ali (BCCI), [20011 UKHL 8, 2002] 1 A.C. 251 (U.K.).
13. ICS, [19981 1 W.L.R. at 9 12 -13.
14. BCCI, [2002] 1 A.C. at 269.
15. Johan Steyn, The Intractable Problem of the Interpretation of Legal Texts, 25 SYDNEY L. REv. 5, 8-10
(2003).
16. Lord Bingham of Cornhill, A New Thing Under the Sun? The Interpretation of Contract and the ICS
Decision, EDINBURGH L. Rrv. 374, 380 (2008).
17. ICS, [1998] 1 W.L.R. at 913.
18. Nicholls, snpra note 8, at 582.
19. Lord Bingham, supra note 16, at 389.
20. Prenn v. Simmonds, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1381, 1384 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (Lord Wil-
berforce). Lord Hoffman reiterated this view in Canterbury Golf Int'l Ltd. v. Yoshimoto, [2002] UKPC 40,
46 (U.K).
21. Staughton, supra note 6, at 305-06.
22. Prenn, [1971] 1 W.L.R. at 1384-85 (Lord Wilberforce).
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Above all, it has been claimed that the rule is significant for reasons of practical policy.23
First, since negotiations leading to major contracts could generate a large amount of mate-
rial, trawling through the material could add to the length and cost of trials.24 In addition,
the rule promotes certainty because third parties who subsequently acquire the interests of
the original contracting parties only have access to the final written document, not to the
contents of the pre-contractual negotiations. 25
There is nevertheless disquiet among academics, jurists, and practitioners about the
defensibility and sustainability of the exclusionary rule.26 This disquiet was deepened
when, in the celebrated ICS case, Lord Hoffmann hinted that the boundaries of the exclu-
sionary rule are "unclear" and that there would be occasion to "explore them." 27 Several
commentators took up the challenge to explore or revise the exclusionary rule. Gerard
McMeel, for instance, highlighted how the rejection of extrinsic evidence as a tool for
construction has resulted in a requirement of judicial "tunnel vision."28 This could pro-
duce injustice when credible evidence of a prior consensus between the contracting parties
is available. 29 This concern is shared by David MacLauchlan, who characterized the ap-
proach as conservative and emphasized how extrinsic evidence may sometimes serve as a
reliable guide to the parties' intention at the time of the contract. 30 When it does, Steven
Gee opined, a court has the responsibility to put into effect the parties' true intent and
meaning, rather than to dictate terms and hold them bound by something to which they
never agreed. 31 Moreover, at the inaugural John Lehane Memorial Lecture, Lord Steyn
described the rule as restrictive and called for the adoption of a more radical approach. 32
Lord Nicholls, also speaking extra-judicially, argued that this area of the law needed to be
re-rationalized. 33 Describing the idea that the notional reasonable person should have
available to him only "some, but not all, of the relevant facts" 34 as being difficult to justify
and even bordering on absurdity, he questioned "why in principle an essentially artificial
barrier should be erected against its use" 35 when this could potentially be "the best evi-
dence of all . . . . "36 The preferable approach, according to Nicholls, is to openly ac-
knowledge that such evidence is relevant and admissible if it holds the potential to assist
the reasonable person in interpreting the contract.37
23. Lord Bingham, supra note 16, at 389.
24. Id. at 389-90.
25. See id. at 382.
26. Id. at 389.
27. Investors Comp. Scheme Ltd. v. W. Bromwich Bldg. Soc'y (ICS), [1998] 1 W.L.R. 896, 913 (H.L.)
(U.K.).
28. Gerard McMeel, Prior Negotiations and Subsequent Conduct-The Next Step Forward for Contractual Inter-
pretation?, 119 L.Q. REV. 272, 272 (2003).
29. Id. at 294.
30. David McLauchlan, Contract Interpretation: What is it About?, 31 SYDNEY L. REV. 4, 8 (2009).
31. Steven Gee, Interpretation of Commercial Contracts, 117 L.Q. REV. 358, 363 (2001).
32. Steyn, supra note 15, at 10.
33. See Nicholls, supra note 8, at 581.
34. Id.
35. See id. "[When there is evidence which would afford useful insight," he stridently remarked, "why
should the judge have to guess when he can know?" Id.
36. Id. at 583.
37. Id.; see also Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527-546
(1947).
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The palpable lack of consensus on the matter therefore cries for further work. How-
ever, Chartbrook may have wasted an opportunity to work through these issues. This dis-
cussion turns to that question next.
II. Chartbrook: A Missed Opportunity
A. THE FACTS
This interesting case involved the interpretation of an overage provision in a contract
concerning the development of a site owned by Chartbrook Ltd. in Wandsworth, United
Kingdom.38 In 2001, Chartbrook hired Persimmon Homes Ltd. to build, at Persimmon's
expense, a mixed residential and commercial development on the land.3 9 In exchange,
Persimmon would be entitled to all sale proceeds less any amount due to Chartbrook.40
According to the schedule of their written contract, the amount due to Chartbrook was
the aggregate of two elements: the Total Land Value4' and the Balancing Payment.42 De-
fined by the schedule as the Additional Residential Payment (ARP), the Balancing Pay-
ment was expressed as 23.4% of the price achieved for each residential unit in excess of the
minimum guaranteed residential unit value (MGRUV), less the costs and incentives
(C&I).43 Chartbrook contended that it understood this provision to mean a guaranteed
minimum amount and an additional amount based upon a percentage of the amount by
which the net residential sales revenue exceeded the guaranteed minimum amount.44 Us-
ing this calculation, 45 the ARP would have been approximately £4.5 million.46 Persim-
mon, on the other hand, argued that the reason for dividing the price into Total Land
Value and ARP was to give Chartbrook a minimum price for its land and to make an
allowance for an increase if the market rose.47 Hence, to Persimmon, Chartbrook should
have received the greater of a fixed percentage of the net sales revenue or a minimum
guaranteed amount; following its calculation,48 the ARP would only be around £900,000,
an amount they had already paid to Chartbrook.49
Thus, around £3.6 million was riding on the interpretation. Chartbrook brought the
case to court to claim the additional amount it insisted was due. Persimmon asserted it
could produce evidence that would demonstrate that on two distinct occasions a detailed
agreement was reached saying that ARP was to be calculated according to Persimmon's
understanding.o It invited the courts to overturn the exclusionary rule in interpreting the




41. This element did not give rise to any undue complications.
42. Chartbrook, [2009] 1 A.C. at 1110.
43. Id. at 1110-t.
44. Id. at 1111.
45. In formulaic terms, this was represented as follows: ARP = 23.4% x (Unit Price-MGRUV-C&I).
46. Chartbrook, [2009] 1 A.C. at 1111.
47. Id.
48. In formulaic terms, ARP was therefore (23.4% x Unit Price)-IVIGRUV-C&I.
49. Chartbrook, [2009] 1 A.C. at 1111.
50. Id. at 1115.
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contract; Persimmon also pleaded a claim for rectification in the alternative in the event
that the courts upheld Chartbrook's position.5'
Both the High Court 52 and the Court of Appeal5 3 upheld Chartbrook's interpretation
but the House of Lords unanimously overturned it. Lord Hoffman emphasized in his lead
judgment how a reasonable person with knowledge of the background would deem the
ARP payable if "the project performs better than is currently anticipated."54 To him, the
term MGRUV strongly indicated that the deal was meant to be a guaranteed minimum
payment for the value of the land in relation to an individual flat; it also signified the
possibility of a larger payment that may not happen.55 The element of contingency, His
Lordship pointed out, was underscored by Paragraph 3.3 of Schedule 6, which stated the
"date of payment if any of the balancing payment;" this interpretation, found in Persim-
mon's favor, was determinative of the appeal.5 6 The House of Lords nevertheless re-
sponded to the issue, raised by Persimmon, of whether a court should only look at the
final version of contractual documents or if it could also look into pre-contractual
negotiations.
B. PRIOR NEGOTIATIONS: THE STATUS Quo DEFENDED
Lord Hoffmann, in what turned out to be his last case as a Law Lord, described the
matter as one of "very considerable general importance."57 However, he dampened
swiftly any optimism of a fresh and sustained debate by dismissing vigorously the call for a
change in the exclusionary rule. Reaffirming his earlier pronouncement in the ICS case,
he stressed not only that the rule has "been in existence for many years,"ss but that there
are pragmatic reasons for its preservation, including the limited utility of previous negoti-
ations, the need to contain costs, and to promote certainty, particularly where third parties
are concerned.59 Any injustice arising from its application would be tempered by the
availability of rectification. Change was, as the rest of the judges concurred, neither war-
ranted nor commendable. Yet in the case itself the need to admit evidence of pre-contrac-
tual negotiations was necessary. Indeed, Baroness Hale admitted that she relied on the
evidence of pre-contractual negotiations to reach her decision in favor of Persimmon.60
This, without a doubt, lent credence to the basis for the dissenting judgment in the Court
of Appeal where Lawrence Collins LJ observed:
[E]very contemporary document prior to the conclusion of the agreement, and every
piece of paper which throws light on the commercial purpose of the provision, sup-
ports Persimmon's case that the deal which was on the table was Persimmon's offer
51. Id.
52. Chartbrook Ltd. v. Persimmon Homes Ltd., [2007] EWHC 409 (Ch.) (Eng.).
53. Chartbrook Ltd. v. Persimmon Homes Ltd., [2008] EWCA Civ. 183 (Eng.) (Lawrence Collins LJ
dissenting).
54. Chartbrook, 12009] 1 A.C. at 1124.
55. Id. at 1112.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1121.
59. Id. at 1118.
60. Id. at 1136.
VOL. 45, NO. 2
NOT READY FOR CHANGE? 631
to Chartbrook of either a fixed percentage of the sales revenue or the minimum guar-
anteed amount, whichever was the greater.61
Lord Hoffmann, however, held strenuously to the exclusionary rule. This is not the
first time His Lordship has proceeded this way. Both an examination of cases where Lord
Hoffmann played a leading role and his extra-judicial pronouncements indicates that he
has held a consistent position regarding the admissibility of extrinsic evidence in the adju-
dication of contentious executed instruments. Since the 1992 landmark House of Lords
decision in Pepper v. Hart62 to admit Parliamentary Hansard as a statutory interpretation
aid, Lord Hoffmann has been one of the jurists leading the charge against the excesses of
the Pepper v. Hart rule, calling for its limitation or abolition.63 He was the first to write, in
a 1997 article, that his experience revealed efficiency concerns and other practical difficul-
ties in relying on the Pepper v. Hart rule.64 He suggested, inter alia, limiting the rule to
defensive estoppel situations to prevent a minister from retreating from statements made
in Parliament.65 He continued this quest in a number of cases in which the rule was
invoked.66
More relevant for this paper is His Lordship's position in the case Union Eagle Ltd. v.
Golden Achievement Ltd.6 7 When the buyer of a Hong Kong flat paid the deposit ten
minutes after the contractually mandated 5:00 P.M. deadline, the seller exercised his op-
tion to rescind the contract and require the buyer to forfeit the deposit. The resulting
litigation ended up in the Privy Council, where Lord Hoffmann rejected the call to apply
equitable principles of unconscionability to remedy the contract on practical business con-
siderations.68 He said:
[1]t is of great importance that if something happens for which the contract has made
express provision, the parties should know with certainty that the terms of the con-
tract will be enforced. The existence of an undefined discretion to refuse to enforce
the contract on the ground that this would be 'unconscionable' is sufficient to create
uncertainty. Even if it is most unlikely that a discretion to grant relief will be exer-
cised, its mere existence enables litigation to be employed as a negotiating tactic. 69
This statement illuminates that Lord Hoffmann's goal in continuing to uphold the ex-
clusionary rule was to protect the sanctity and certainty of contracts and business expecta-
tions and to avoid the manipulation of the negotiation process. These goals were the
motivation behind his decline to revisit the exclusionary rule in Chartbrook.
61. Chartbrook Ltd. v. Persimmon Homes Ltd., [2008] EWCA Civ. 183, [69] (Eng.).
62. Pepper v. Hart, [1993] A.C. 593, [1992] UKHL 3 (on appeal from Eng.) (U.K.).
63. Stefan Vogenauer, A Retreat from Pepper v. Hart? A Reply to Lord Steyn, 25 OxFon J. LEGAL Si ro.
629, 637 (2005).
64. Lord Hoffmann, The Intolerable Wrestle with Words and Meanings, 114 S. AmR. LJ. 662, 668-69 (1997).
65. Id. at 669.
66. See, e.g., Robinson v. Secr'y of State for N. Ir. [2002] UKHL 32 (U.K.); h, re P (FC) [2003] UKHL 8,
[2003] 2 A.C. 663, 678 (appeal from Eng.) (U.K.); Quintavalle v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Auth.
[2005] UKHL 28, [20051 2 WLR 1061, 1071.
67. Union Eagle Ltd. v. Golden Achievement Ltd., [1997] A.C. 514 (U.K.).
68. Id. at 517.
69. Id. at 519.
SUMMER 2011
632 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
In Chartbrook, His Lordship relied on the following speech by Lord Blackburn in the
1877 case Inglis v. Buttery70 to argue that the exclusionary rule has a long history:
[W]here parties agree to embody, and do actually embody, their contract in a formal
written deed, then in determining what the contract really was and really meant, a
Court must look to the formal deed and to that deed alone. This is only carrying out
the will of the parties. The only meaning of adjusting a formal contract is, that the
formal contract shall supersede all loose and preliminary negotiations-that there
shall be no room for misunderstandings which may often arise, and which do con-
stantly arise, in the course of long, and it may be desultory conversations, or in the
course of correspondence or negotiations during which the parties are often widely at
issue as to what they will insist on and what they will concede. The very purpose of a
formal contract is to put an end to the disputes which would inevitably arise if the
matter were left upon verbal negotiations or upon mixed communings partly consist-
ing of letters and partly of conversations. The written contract is that which is to be
appealed to by both parties, however different it may be from their previous demands
or stipulations, whether contained in letters or in verbal conversation. 7'
It is regrettable that His Lordship made no mention of the lead judgment delivered by
Lord Hatherley in the same case. While Lord Hatherley did comment on the exclusion-
ary rule, he did not articulate it as strongly as Lord Blackburn did. Besides, Lord
Hatherley stated at the outset:
There has been a good deal of evidence adduced with the view of expounding the
contract, not for the purpose of explaining the meaning of particular technical phrase
used in the contract, which is a purpose for which it is quite legitimate to use external
evidence; but where the words of the contract are not themselves in any way techni-
cal, but are plain and simple language, at all events, so plain and simple as to require
no aid of testimony specially to explain them,-in that case it is not legitimate to
introduce parol testimony to say what the meaning of the contract is.72
Lord Hatherley clearly made an exception for the admissibility of "external evidence"
for the purposes of explaining technical phrases used in the contract. If His Lordship's
view was not overlooked in subsequent cases and by Lord Hoffmann in particular, the law
on the exclusion of pre-contractual negotiations would have been very different. In Chart-
brook, the interpretive issue was clearly technical: ARP and MGRUV. In Lord
Hatherley's view, this is clearly a basis for allowing evidence of pre-contractual negotia-
tions. In Chartbrook, Lord Hoffmann endorsed fully Lord Blackburn's view of the exclu-
sionary rule to the exclusion of Lord Hatherley's opinion because it gelled with Lord
Hoffman's disposition against the admissibility of extrinsic evidence.
70. Inglis v. Buttery, (1878) 3 App. Cas. 552. In Inglis, Lord Blackburn famously restated with approval
Lord Gifford's earlier judgment in the Court of Appeal.
71. Id. at 577.
72. Id. at 558.
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Therefore, it was inaccurate in Chartbrook to trace the rule to Inglis and claim that "[t]o
allow evidence of pre-contractual negotiations to be used in aid of construction would
therefore require the House to depart from a long and consistent line of authority."73
C. "HORSE By ANOTHER NAME"
Indeed, the force of the House of Lords' argument is further weakened because some
courts already admit pre-contractual negotiations when construing contracts. They do so
under various nomenclatures.
1. Unity of Transaction
The first is called "Unity of Transaction."7 4 In the general construction of contracts,
the courts refer to, and invariably rely on, documents that are considered one continuous
transaction. Courts take these documents together with the contentious document as one
unit that consolidated the transaction. Throughout the Nineteenth Century, courts have
relied on documents other than the contract to interpret the contract. In the 1812 case
Barton v. Fitzgerald, it was stated, inter alia, that "a true rule of construction [was] that the
sense and meaning of the parties in any particular part of an instrument may be collected
ex antecedentibus et consequentibus; every part of it may be brought into action in order to
collect from the whole one uniform and consistent sense." 75 To this effect, courts have
read together, for instance, a company's memorandum and articles of association,76 a lease
and counterpart,77 and a bill of sale and mortgage deed. 78
In recent times, courts have continued with the principle of relying on related docu-
ments to interpret a contract. One notable instance was the aforementioned ICS case
where a brochure that gave a background explanation to an assignment of rights to sue in
a class action for negligent mortgage advice was accepted as important background that
helped resolve a dispute in the contractual document.79 Speaking for the majority in the
House of Lords, Lord Hoffmann stated that we "should start with the assumption that the
layman who read the explanatory note and did not venture into the [contractual docu-
ment] itself was being given accurate account of the effect of the transaction" and that the
explanatory document was "significant" in interpreting the contract.80 If explanatory
notes relating to a contract are so important in the construction of a contract term, it is
difficult to appreciate the exclusion of a communication or document that preceded the
final execution of the contract. In an indication of the pervasive role technology-related
matters would play in the interpretation of contracts in the new millennium, the Court of
73. Chartbrook Ltd. v. Persimmon Homes Ltd., [2009] UKHL 38, [2009] 1 A.C. 1101, 1116 (appeal taken
from Eng.) (UK).
74. Other texts have described this as "documents forming part of the same transaction" or a "composite
transaction." See LAURENCE KOFFMAN & ELIZABETH MACDONALD, THE LAW OF CoNTRAcr, at XXI (6th
ed. 2007), and Kum LEWISON, THE INTERPRETATTON OF COrRAcrs 49 (3rd ed. 2004).
75. Barton v. Fitzgerald, (1812) 15 East 530, 541 (U.K.).
76. In re Capital Fire Ins., (1882) 21 Ch.D. 209 (U.K).
77. Burchell v. Clark, (1876) 2 C.P.D. 88 (U.K.).
78. Edwards v. Marcus, [1894] 1 Q.B. 587 (U.K.).
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Appeal held in Harbinger UK Ltd. v. GEI Information Services Ltd. that end user agreements
for the use of computer software must be taken into consideration in construing the origi-
nal contract for the supply of the software by the manufacturer.8t It can be argued that
the end user agreement was attached to the original agreement as a "schedule," and there-
fore was part of the contract. It is also true, however, that the two agreements (between
the manufacturer and the distributor and between the distributor and the end user) were
separate and involved third parties. Interestingly, the Supreme Court itself, the successor
to the House of Lords, ruled recently that even "without prejudice" communications were
admissible in evidence as "justice clearly demands it."82 The principle is clear: courts will
rely on related documents to interpret a contentious contractual provision.
2. Matrix of Fact
Lord Wilberforce in the landmark case Prenn v. Simmonds83 defined the matrix of fact as
the process by which courts look "beyond the language and see what the circumstances
were with reference to which the words were used, and the object, appearing from those
circumstances, which the person using them had in view." 84 Although this definition by
itself is capacious enough to encompass pre-contractual exchange,85 Lord Hoffmann later
described it as an "understated description of what the background may include." 86 Taking
together Lord Wilberforce's bold statement emphasizing the antiquity of isolating agree-
ments from their respective backgrounds and circumstances and Lord Hoffmann's indica-
tion of the insufficiency of "matrix of fact," it appears the logical conclusion is that
reasonable evidence of pre-contractual negotiations forms part of the background matrix
to be considered.87 This view is reinforced by Lord Hoffmann's emphatic statement that
"absolutely anything which would have affected the way in which the language of the
document would have been understood by a reasonable man" must be included in the
background material.88 His Lordship added, "there is no conceptual limit to what can be
regarded as background."8 9 The matrix of fact therefore includes the "genesis" of the
transaction, its "aims" or goals, and all relevant background facts, as well as the operation
of the law at the time of the contract.90 The evidence, for example, that a particular law
influenced the parties can easily be gleaned from the pre-contractual negotiations.
81. Harbinger UK Ltd. v. GE Info. Svcs. Ltd., [2000] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 166, at TlT 8, 14.
82. Oceanbulk Shipping & Trading SA v. TMT Asia Ltd., [20101 UKSC 44, [2010] 3 W.L.R. 1424, 1440
(Lord Clarke); see also Ofulue v. Bossert, [2009] UKHL 16, [2009) 1 A.C. 990, at T 57; Rush & Tompkins Ltd.
v. Greater London Council, [1988] 3 All E.R. 737, 740 (H.L.) (U.K.).
83. Prenn v. Simmonds, [19711 1 W.L.R. 1381 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K).
84. Id. at 1384.
85. McMeel, supra note 28, at 275.
86. Investors Comp. Scheme Ltd. v. W. Bromwich Bldg. Soc'y (ICS), [1998] 1 W.L.R. 896, 912 (H.L.)
(U.K).
87. Vincent Nelson, The Interpretation of Contracts: The Rules Re-written for Modem Times, at 16,
Mar. 31, 2004, http://www.39essex.co.uk/docs/articles/ViNseminar Contracts handout 310304 FINAL.
pdf.
88. ICS, [19881 1 W.L.R. at 913.
89. Bank of Credit & Commerce Int'l SA v. Ali (BCCI), [2001] UKHL 8, (2002] 1 A.C. 251, at T 39 (U.K.).
90. Prenn v. Simmonds, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1381, 1385 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (UK).
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Specific elements of prior negotiations that courts have excluded include drafts of
agreements,9 legal opinions,92 and comfort letters.9 3 As noted above, the reasons given
for the exclusionary rule include the assertion that the pre-contractual negotiations evi-
dence is not helpful. This is because the parties' positions remain malleable or are contin-
uously changing as negotiations progress and so it is difficult to ascertain a party's precise
position until the final agreement. This is very similar to the argument made for the
exclusion of Hansard as a statutory interpretation aid.94 It was argued that the speeches in
Parliament were not helpful to a court in illuminating sufficiently the confusion or ambi-
guity in particular legislative provisions. 95 As Lord Reid averred, to embark on a search
for illumination from Parliamentary speeches would amount to "looking for a needle in a
haystack [when] more often than not the needle is not there." 96 Unlike MPs in a multi-
hundred, multi-issue chamber, parties in contractual negotiations often represent two
sides and mainly speak with a unanimity that is not easily achievable in the parliamentary
setting. Also, positions or views in negotiations are usually well considered and target a
specific goal or response. That Hansard is still admissible with all the tentativeness, mal-
leability, abruptness, and political posturing or bargaining that goes with it, albeit under
somewhat restrained circumstances, is the strongest argument for the reasonable admissi-
bility of pre-contractual negotiations.
More importantly, sometimes this information is crucial in determining the outcome of
the case, as in Chartbrook itself. Baroness Hale admitted as much when she disarmingly
said, "I have to confess that I would not have found it quite so easy to reach this conclu-
sion had we not been made aware of the agreement which the parties had reached on this
aspect of their bargain during the negotiations which led up to the formal contract. On
any objective view, that made the matter crystal clear." 97 A strict application of the exclu-
sionary rule, therefore, has the potential to bring injustice to contract parties.98
3. Rectification
Courts have frequently stated that pre-contractual negotiations can be admitted to rec-
tify a contract. Rectification is a remedy in equity that allows courts to correct mistakes
made by a contract party.99 Rectification has been invoked to address inconsistency in the
terms of a contract, to correct wrong designation of parties, and to effectuate the intention
91. Nat'l Bank of Australasia v. Falkingham & Sons, [1902] A.C. 585, 591; Youell v. Bland Welch & Co.,
[1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 127, 128.
92. Rabin v. Gerson Berger Ass'n, [1986] 1 W.L.R. 526 (C.A.).
93. Scottish Power Plc. v. Britoil Exploration Ltd., [1997] 94(47) Law Soc. Gaz. 30 (C.A. (Civ.)).
94. See Nicholls, supra note 8, at 590.
95. Id.
96. Lord Reid, The Judge as Law Maker, 12 J. Soc. PUB. TCHRS. L. 22, 28 (1972-73).
97. Chartbrook Ltd. v. Persimmon Homes Ltd., [2009] UKHL 38, [2009] 1 A.C. 1101, at | 99 (appeal
taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
98. In the Charthrook case, Persimmon would have had to pay an additional £3.6 million had evidence of the
parties' prior negotiations not been available to the court. See id. at 1101. In any event, the court is already
allowed to look at evidence of how the market works, or any custom that is commonly regarded as binding on
everyone in the market. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 9,
Apr. 11, 1980, 15 U.S.C.A. App. (West 1997), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (CISG).
99. 1 H.G. BEALE, Ca-rY ON CorNTRACTs 487-88 (30th ed. 2008).
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of the parties. 00 The threshold for the burden to prove mistake is very high and success
in rectification is "notoriously" difficult; this is to avoid jeopardizing the certainty and
predictability of contracts.101 Commonly, however, to prove mistake "reference must be
made to documents preceding the document to be rectified, such as drafts, offer docu-
ments, [and] promotional material issued to induce people to contract."l 02 All of these
documents constitute the background and context of the contract. It is difficult to appre-
ciate the excision of documents or evidence of negotiations that preceded the contract
from drafts, promotional materials, or previously agreed to text of the contract. Perhaps it
is for this reason that the lawyers for Persimmon pleaded for the rectification remedy as
an alternative to their preferred view of the construction of the contentious contractual
provision.103 Their plea for rectification compelled the courts to examine the background,
including pre-contract negotiations, in an unstinting manner. 104 This strategy led Law-
rence Collins LJ in the Court of Appeal and Baroness Hale in the House of Lords to
conclude their analyses and reasoning in favor of Persimmon.105 Lord Nicholls described
this practice in his days as barrister:
[Tihe practice was that when the parties' pre-contract negotiations furnished some
insight into their actual intentions, one or other of the parties would include a rectifi-
cation claim in the proceedings. By this means, whatever the outcome of the rectifi-
cation claim, the evidence of the parties' actual intentions would be before the court.
The hope was that, either consciously or subconsciously, the judge's thinking on the
interpretation issue would be influenced by this evidence.oO
The courts, therefore, assisted by astute lawyers, resort to pre-contractual negotiations
under a different name.107
In practice, "all but the most negligent of counsel"108 will plead rectification alongside
interpretation to ensure that pre-contractual negotiations come before the court to influ-
ence the judge's thinking on interpretation. 109 It therefore seems paradoxical and illogical
that though such evidence, admitted for the rectification purpose, affects how a judge
views the outcome of the interpretation issue it is not directly admissible for the purpose
100. Id.
101. Rhodian River Shipping Co. v. Halla Maritime Corp., [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 373, 375 (Q.B.); see also
The Olympic Pride [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 67, 73 (Q.B.).
102. M. CLARKE, VITIATING FACTORS, in FURMSTON, supra note 7, at 935.




106. Nicholls, supra note 8, at 578.
107. In Arrale v. Costain, Lord Denning admonished the High Court judge for allowing himself to be influ-
enced by evidence of pre-contractual negotiations rightfully admitted in plea of misrepresentation and "non
est. factum." Arrale v. Costain, [19761 1 Lloyd's Rep. 98, 101 (C.A.) (U.K.). Lord Denning then wondered if
courts have not been unconsciously influenced by the evidence of pre-contractual negotiations admitted
under misrepresentation, rectification and other "legitimate" grounds. Id.
108. Richard Buxton, "Construction" and Rectification After Charthrook, 69(2) CAMBRIDGE L.J. 253, 253
(2010).
109. Nicholls, sipra note 8, at 578.
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of the latter." 0 Neither an explanation nor a justification has been offered for the disso-
nance."I Yet, if left intact, parties will continue to rely upon rectification as a method of
ensuring that courts have access to pre-contractual negotiations.112
4. The "Private Dictionary" Rule
Practice in the lower courts, too, appears to be moving towards the admissibility of pre-
contractual negotiations to aid the interpretation of disputed provisions. Courts can use
pre-contractual negotiations to determine whether a word with multiple possible mean-
ings that parties have allegedly negotiated to have only one particular meaning has in fact
been used in that one way.1 3 This is also known commonly as the "private dictionary
rule," that is, where the parties are said to have given their "own dictionary meaning to the
words as the result of their common intention."I"4
In The Karen Oltnann, a provision in a two-year charter party provided that
"[c]harterers [were] to have the option to redeliver the vessel after 12 months' trading
subject [to] giving 3 months' notice."Is After nineteen months of trading, the charterers
gave three months notice of their intention to redeliver the ship."16 A dispute arose re-
garding the meaning of "after 12 months.""l7 Kerr J held that the Court was entitled to
examine the pre-contractual negotiations." 8 Having done that, His Lordship came to the
conclusion that the parties had meant that "after 12 months" meant "on expiry of" twelve
months.1 9 About six years later, the Court of Appeal in The Pacific Colocotronis120 admit-
ted evidence of exchange or request by the master of the ship, concluding that the contract
was for "lightening" and not for "discharge" and that assistance was meant to be sufficient
to prevent further risk of oil pollution.121 In taking the view that "the negotiations, and
what occurred during them, are 'permissible' factors to take into account in order to con-
strue the words of this contract," Eveleigh LJ drew support from Lord Wilberforce's
statement in Prenn v. Sinimonds:
The time has long passed when agreements, even those under seal, were isolated
from the matrix of facts in which they were set and interpreted purely on internal
110. See Janet O'Sullivan, Say What You Mean and Mean What You Say: Contractual Interpretation in the House
ofLords, 68(3) CAMBRID)GE L.J. 510, 510 (2009); see also Oceanbulk Shipping & Trading SA v. TMT Asia Ltd.,
[2010] UKSC 44, [2010] 3 W.L.R. 1424, 1437 (Ward LJ).
111. Buxton, supra note 108, at 260.
112. Paul Davies, Negotiating The Boundaries OfAdmissibility, 70(1) CAMBRIDGE L.J. 24, 26 (2011).
113. BEALiE, supra note 99, at 879.
114. Partenreederei M.S. Karen Oltmann v. Scarsdale Shipping Co. (The Karen Oltmann), [1976] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 708, 712 (Q.B.D.) (Kerr J).




119. Id. Lord Hoffmann, however, characterized this case as "an illegitimate extension of the 'private dic-
tionary' principle." Chartbrook Ltd. v. Persimmon Homes Ltd., [2009] UKHL 38, [20091 1 A.C. 1101, at T[
47 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). For a rebuttal of this position, see David McLauchlan, Interpretation And
Rectification: Lord Hofinann's Last Stand, 2009 N.Z. LAw REv. 431, 446-51 (2009).
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linguistic considerations ... [w]e must ... enquire beyond the language and see what
the circumstances were in reference to which words were used, and the object appear-
ing from those circumstances, which the person using them had in view.122
When the same court again allowed pre-contractual negotiations to be admitted to as-
certain the meaning of the disputed term "preferred supplier status" in ProForce Recruit
Ltd. v. Rugby Group Ltd.,123 it was said to have established a principle that extrinsic evi-
dence could be admitted on the basis that the parties' common intention was being
identified.124
D. OTHER JURISPRUDENCE AND JURISDICTIONS
Not only domestic courts are amenable to the inclusion of extrinsic evidence. Jurisdic-
tions outside of England and Wales and international jurisprudence are also firmly on the
side of admitting evidence of pre-contractual negotiations in interpreting contracts. In
Chartbrook, Lord Hoffmann referred dismissively to the civil law practice of admissibil-
ity' 2 5 but the practice is much more universal than he was inclined to acknowledge. Arti-
cle 8 of the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) is
a codification of the international position regarding admissibility of pre-contractual ne-
gotiations in the settlement of contractual disputes.126 It allows for the admissibility of
prior statements and negotiations to establish the intent of the parties or to establish what
a reasonable person, given the background of the contract and placed in similar circum-
stances, would understand the parties to have intended by their statements or conduct.127
Section 3 of article 8 states unequivocally, "in determining the intent of a party or the
understanding a reasonable person would have had, due consideration is to be given to all
relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices which the par-
ties have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the par-
ties."'28 Article 4, sections 1 and 2 of the UNIDROIT (Revised) Principles of
International Commercial Contracts and CISG have similar terms, but UNIDROIT goes
further in article 4, section 3 to list not only negotiations and conduct of the parties, but
also the nature and purpose of the contract as well as the conduct of the parties subsequent
to the contract.129 Although the United Kingdom is not a party to CISG, it has been
122. Id.
123. ProForce Recruit Ltd. v. Rugby Group Ltd., 2006] EWCA Civ. 69, at 30 (Arden LJ).
124. Shy Jackson, Pre-Contractual Negotiations- Recent Trends in the Interpretation of Contracts, 23(4) CONST.
LJ. 268, 275 (2007).
125. Chartbrook Ltd. v. Persimmon Homes Ltd., [2009] UKHL 38, [2009] 1 A.C. 1101, at 1 39 (appeal
taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
126. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 8, Apr. 11, 1980, 15
U.S.C.A. App. (West 1997), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (CISG).
127. CISG art. 8.
128. Id.
129. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROI Principles of International
Commercial Contracts art. 4 §§ 1-3 (1994), 34 I.L.M. 1067 (1995).
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ratified by more than seventy-four countries, including major trading countries such as the
United States, Australia, and most European countries.o3 0
Even the United States, the world's biggest economy, has essentially done away with
the exclusionary rule, inspired by CISG and its own domestic jurisprudence. The Uni-
form Commercial Code (UCC), the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and a number of
cases have held admissible evidence of pre-contractual negotiations as a vital instrument in
contract interpretation.131 In Germany, the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo encompasses
liability incurred during pre-contractual negotiations even if the negotiations do not result
ultimately in a contract.132 Although the remedy is not entirely within the law of contract,
it allows for the reception of evidence of the negotiations.133 The empfangs-theorie permits
courts to admit evidence of correspondence, including electronic communication, to es-
tablish the intention of the parties to contract and prove that a party suffered a loss be-
cause of another party failing to complete or honor the contract.' 34 In an action in culpa in
contrahendo where the terms of a contract between two merchants was ambiguous, the
court admitted evidence of the negotiations, including the parties' telegraphic communi-
cation, to ascertain the terms and to apportion liability."s5 Articles 1362-1369 of the Ital-
ian Civil Code, 1258 and 1282 of the Spanish Code, and the codes of many other
countries in Europe all permit the admission of conduct, usages, or contractual negotia-
tions in the determination of either the subjective common intent of the contracting par-
ties or the objective intent as measured by a reasonable person.136 The emerging aqui in
European contract law as recorded in the 1998 revision of the Principles of European
Contract Law all encourage the admission of all relevant background circumstances in
interpreting contracts.' 37 Article 5:102 mandates a non-exhaustive list of seven circum-
stances to take into account in contractual interpretation.138 The first is "the circum-
stances in which [the contract] was concluded, including the preliminary negotiations." 39
Others include "good faith and fair dealing, usages, and the nature and purpose of the
contract."' 4 o This list is reflective of the CISG and UNIDROIT provisions on the subject
of interpretation. In the United Kingdom itself, Scottish law admits the circumstances
listed in article 5:102, excepting the conduct of the parties subsequent to the completion
of the contract.141
130. See Journal of Law & Commerce CISG Contracting States and Declarations Table, 14J.L. & COM. 237, 244
(1995). Some U.S. courts have applied Article 8 of CISG in cases before them. See, e.g., Filanto, S.p.A v.
Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
131. See, e.g., W.W.W. Assocs. v. Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 566 (1990), and Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, §§ 202(4), 214 (1981).
132. 1 BASIL MARKESINIS ET AL., THE G.RJOAN LAW OF OBLIGATIONs 64 (3rd ed. 1997).
133. Id.
134. Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Jan. 2, 2002, 1 Bundesgesetzblatti (BGBl.] § 130 (Ger.).
135. Entscheidungen Des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen (RGZ] [Federal Civil Senate] Apr. 5, 1922, 104,
265, no.19 (Ger.).
136. OLE LANDO & HucHI Bi.ALE, PRINCIPIL'S OF EUROPEAN CONrAcr LAW (PAWs I & 11) 293 (2000).
137. Principles of European Contract Law art. 5, § 102 (1998).
138. See generally id.
139. Id. § 102(a).
140. Id. § 102(c), (f-(g).
141. See Bank of Scot. v. Dunedin Prop. Inv. Co. (1998) S.C. 657, 665 (where prior negotiations, or "com-
munings," were admitted by the Court of Session).
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It is further noteworthy that even in common law jurisdictions which adopt an objective
theory of contract like New Zealand, the courts have ruled that "while the degree of
assistance to be derived from prior negotiations in ascertaining the presumed intention of
the parties will vary greatly from one contract to another, courts should not disqualify
themselves from obtaining that assistance when it is available." 42 Likewise, in Singapore
it has been suggested that such evidence may be admissible for the purpose of interpreta-
tion.143 Importantly, Lord Hoffmann himself acknowledged in Chartbrook that the admis-
sion of extrinsic evidence does not represent an inconsistency with the objective theory of
contractual interpretation. 44 But for the reasons mentioned above, he declared that
"there is no clearly established case for departing from the exclusionary rule."s45 In so
proceeding, the benefit of uniformity in international transactions is devalued 46 at a time
when interpretation of contract is crucial to international trade.147 For all the reasons in
section III, Chartbrook was a missed opportunity to provide a much-needed clarification, if
not rationalization, of the law.
IV. Charting The Way Forward
The previous discussion points to the feasibility of change as well as the need for it.
That said, the policy reasons highlighted by the courts 48 will have to be carefully consid-
ered if extrinsic evidence is to be admitted on a basis wider than what is currently allowed
or practiced. On the issue of costs, however, commentators have rightly pointed out that
it seems anomalous that costs are deemed a hindrance when it comes to construction but
not so when prior negotiations are admitted for the purposes of rectification,' 49 in inter-
preting oral contracts, or in establishing additional obligations in a collateral contract. 50
The position of third parties, too, should not be an impediment to a more inclusionary
approach. Third parties have made the choice to involve themselves with the contract so
they need to accept that the courts may look at prior negotiations as an aid to interpreta-
tioni5 to increase accuracy and the likelihood of a just outcome.152 While this paper does
not presume to delineate the precise circumstances under which courts can waive or set
aside the exclusionary rule, approximations can be made with existing law to allow pre-
contractual negotiations to be admitted.
142. Vector Gas Ltd. v. Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd. [2010] NZSC 5, at 129 (Wilson J); see also Wholesale
Distribs. Ltd. v. Gibbons Holdings Ltd., [20071 NZSC 37, at 113.
143. Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. v. B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte. Ltd. [2008] 3
SLR(R) 1029.
144. Chartbrook Ltd. v. Persimmon Homes Ltd., [2009] UKHL 38, [2009] 1 A.C. 1101, T 33 (appeal taken
from Eng.) (U.K).
145. Id. | 41.
146. Steyn, supra note 15, at 8.
147. Pawel Moskwa, Interpretation of Commercial Contracts in the Future European Civil Code-Objective or
Subjective Method? (1) ELSA SPEL 51, 51 (2004).
148. See, e.g., ProForce Recruit Ltd. v. Rugby Group Ltd., [20061 EWCA Civ. 69, at [ 57 (Arden LJ). But
admission beyond what is currently allowed must be considered carefully.
149. Vector Gas Ltd. v. Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd. 2010] NZSC 5, at 1 129 (Wilson J).
150. The "Tychy" (No. 2), 120011 EWCA Civ. 1198, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 403, at 36; CATHERINE MITCHELL,
INTERPRETATION OF CONTfRACTS 76-77 (2007).
151. See Vector Gas, [2010] NZSC at IT 13, 71, 75 (Wilson J).
152. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1, at 933.
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One such situation is where the parties reach consensus ad idem prior to executing the
final agreement.1 5 3 In other words, each party was aware of the position of the other and
agreed with it. 5 4 Each party had notice and did not object so they have accepted the
other party's point.1 55 The closest approximation is the mechanics of offer and accept-
ance.
15 6 An offer is made, it is accepted or rejected or counter-offer made, or the offer
lapses. That can be the end of the negotiations. But if the offer or counter-offer is ac-
cepted and that acceptance is communicated to the offeror, then that process can be part
of the background negotiations that should be accepted in evidence to interpret disputed
provisions.
The second circumstance where courts should admit pre-contractual negotiations is
where the term in contention is a custom of the trade or a term of art. Courts may not
have the relevant expertise to ascertain the content and validity of the particular custom or
term. A more complicated situation is where the parties waive or agree not to follow a
particular stricture or requirement of the trade custom; not only is expert evidence
needed, but the negotiations or communications that led to the acceptance or waiver of
the term are needed as well. The courts have held that for a custom to be upheld, it must
be lawful, certain, reasonable, in existence for a long time, and must be known to the
parties in the case.15 7 To ascertain any of these elements, courts might need pre-contrac-
tual negotiations.1s The exclusionary rule should not impede this quest.
Courts should take the same approach with the private dictionary rule. When the par-
ties have agreed to the specific meaning of the term in dispute, courts should find that
meaning even if they must use pre-contractual negotiations. The same position should be
held when the term in dispute is a technical one. As already noted, Lord Hatherley made
this point in his judgment in the Inglis case.159
Courts should also admit pre-contractual negotiations when the relevant information is
electronically stored or available. 160 This would help assuage the cost concerns of defend-
ers of the rule. These defenders are legitimately concerned about the cost implications of
waiving the rule,161 particularly the cases where the witnesses have to be called to give oral
testimony.162 If the information needed is electronically available, the cost will be mini-
mal. If justice in the case requires that pre-contractual negotiations must be examined, it
would be contrary to the calling and core mission of the judiciary not to do so. It is
153. See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE LJ. 939, 944-51 (1967).
For a discussion of the apparent uncertainty in the approach of English Law to "'common intent"' in the
interpretation of contracts, see Mitchell, sipra note 150, at 71-76.
154. See Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. Hansen-Tangent, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 989, 966, [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 621,
628; Bank of Credit & Commerce Int'l SA v. Ali (BCCI), [2001] UKHL 8, [2001] 1 All E.R. 961, at 1 49;
Burrows v. Jamaica Private Power Co. [2002] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 374, [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 468, at J 14.
155. BCCI, [20011 1 All E.R., at 2.
156. See LINDA MULCAHY, CONTRACT LAW IN PERSPECTIVE 57-81 (5th ed. 2008).
157. FRANCIS REYNOLDS, BOWSTFAD AND REYNOLDS ON AGENCY 130-34 (19th ed. 2006); Francis N.
Botchway, Can the Law Compel Business Parties to Negotiate?, 3(3) J. WNORLD ENERGY L. & Bus. 286, 298-99
(2010).
158. Staughton, supra note 6, at 312.
159. Inglis v. Buttery, (1878) 3 App. Cas. 552, 558.
160. See Oceanbulk Shipping & Trading SA v. TMT Asia Ltd., [2010] UJKSC 44, [2010] 3 W.L.R. 1424,
1428 (Lord Clarke) (the "Without Prejudice" communication was mainly by email).
161. See Davies, supra note 112, at 25-26.
162. Id.
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perhaps for these reasons that the courts, Lord Hoffmann in particular, accept reliance on
rectification, factual matrix, and background of the contract in dispute. Courts should
move beyond the complexities involved with applying these terms by admitting pre-con-
tractual negotiations.
In the end, the essence of this paper's argument turns on evidence-whether pre-con-
tractual negotiations should be admitted, and if so, under what circumstances or condi-
tions should it be admitted to aid the interpretation of contentious contractual provisions.
For classical legal writers like Bentham, all or any rational material that would help deter-
mine the case must be admitted.163 The only restraint should be the weight given to a
particular piece of evidence. 164 He, like John Wigmore,s65 distinguished the science of
evidence from the law of evidence, and suggested that the latter is a sinister invention of
lawyers.166 This position appears to have influenced the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence
when it stated the goals of the Rules of Evidence as "the ascertainment of the truth and
the just determination of the proceedings."16 7
In reality, however, there are clear and reasonable policy reasons for the law of evidence
and its exclusionary tendencies. For example, admitting everything could lead to long
delays in the just determination of the proceedings and therefore the denial of justice.
Lord Hoffmann advanced similar policy grounds for the exclusion of pre-contractual ne-
gotiations in the Cbartbrook case.16 8 If the pre-contractual negotiation is relevant to re-
moving the cloud of doubt and controversy surrounding the meaning of the contested
provision, and it satisfies any of the conditions outlined previously in this article, it should
be admitted.169
The issue then is one of relevance, and to some extent management and weight. Lord
Simon offered a generally acceptable definition of relevant evidence as one "which makes
the matter which requires proof more or less probable." 70 The simplest definition of
relevance is that offered by the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence. Relevant evidence "means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable than it would be without the evidence."171
Although relevance is one of logic and not of law, it has been absolved into law by the
combination of the probative value of a particular piece of evidence and its admissibil-
ity.1
7 2 The exclusion of pre-contractual negotiations is therefore a throwback to the dis-
tinction between the logic or probative value of the evidence and its admissibility, which is
163. See JEREMY BEN1-HAM, THE RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 1, 19 (1827).
164. Id. at 21.
165. See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF 1, 821 (1913).
166. BENTHAM, supra note 163, at 740. For insights into the views of the classical writers on evidence, see
generally PETER MURPHY, EVIDENCE, PROOF, AND FACTS: A BOOK OF SOURCEs (2003).
167. See FED. R. EVID. 102.
168. See generally Chartbrook Ltd. v. Persimmon Homes Ltd., [2009] UKHL 38, [2009] 1 A.C. 1101 (appeal
taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
169. See generally id. For a counter-argument, see generally Catherine Mitchell, Contract Interpretation: Prag-
matism, Principle and the Prior Negotiations Rule, 26(2) J. Cowr. L. 134-59 (2010).
170. Bank of Credit & Commerce Int'l SA v. Ali (BCCI), [2001] UKHL 8, [2002] 1 A.C. 251, 269 (U.K)
(making it clear that relevance is the criteria for the determination of the background material to be
admitted).
171. FED. R. EVID. 401.
172. See PETER MURPHY, MURPHY ON EVIDENCE 9 & 30 (11th ed. 2009); COLIN TAPPER,
CROSS AND TAPPER ON EVIDENCE 77 (10th ed. 2004).
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a question of law. It is judge-made law that excludes pre-contractual negotiations, not the
logic or the probative properties of the evidence. 173 This paper calls for a reintegration of
the logic and the law in the handling of pre-contractual negotiations in the interpretation
of contracts. For, as Lord Steyn stated, "a judge ruling on a point of admissibility involv-
ing an issue of relevance has to decide whether the evidence is capable of increasing or
diminishing the probability of the existence of a fact in issue."' 7 4 This can be done by first
ascertaining the probative value of the evidence, then proceeding to determine the weight
to be attached to it.
The weight of any piece of evidence is "a qualitative assessment of the probative value
which the admissible evidence has in relation to the facts in issue," 175 that is, whether the
evidence is strong enough to persuade the judge that it is enough by itself or taken to-
gether with other factors to dispose of the issue at hand. The determination of weight to
be derived from relevant documents is usually a matter of degree.176 The assessment is
based on a range of factors integral or external to the fact at issue. These include timeli-
ness, reliability, and truthfulness. Admittedly, it is difficult to separate admissibility from
weight,177 but to foreclose any possibility of the probative value of pre-contractual negoti-
ations because of the challenge of weight allocation is not coterminous with the manage-
ment responsibilities of the judge under the Civil Procedure Rules of 1998.
The Civil Procedure Rules of 1998, preceded by the Woolf Civil Procedure Report of
1996, have given judges considerable powers to manage civil trials in ways that promote
justice. 7 8 Rule 32.1 is relevant for our purposes; it provides that the court may control
the evidence by giving directions as to:
a) the issues on which it requires evidence;
b) the nature of the evidence which it requires to decide those issues; and
c) the way in which evidence is to be placed before the court.179
The court has discretion regarding what to admit and the nature of the evidence to be
admitted. There is no absolute discretion to exclude. On the contrary, Rule 32.2 provides
that the "court may use its power to exclude evidence that would otherwise be admissi-
ble."' 80 The rule to exclude pre-contractual negotiations as stated in Chartbrook is not
founded on the civil procedure rules, and its absolutist conception is not consistent with
the discretionary formulation of Rule 32. The admission of evidence of pre-contractual
negotiations, as advocated in this paper, based on relevance and weight will be in accord
with the modernized management ethos of the Civil Procedure Rules.
173. As Lord Steyn put it in Regina v. Randall, relevance is determinable by common sense and experience.
Regina v. Randall, [2003] TKHL 69, [2004] 1 ALL E.R. 67 (U.K). See also ADRIAN KEANE, MODERN
LAW OF EVIDENCE 20 (5th ed. 2000). In Oceanbulk, the trial judge found that the "Without Prejudice"
pre-contractual negotiations were "potentially of significant probative value." Oceanbulk Shipping & Trad-
ing SA v. TMT Asia Ltd., [2010] UKSC 44, [20101 3 W.L.R. 1424, at 1 13.
174. Oceanbulk, [2010] 3 W.L.R., at 1 13.
175. Murphy, supra note 172, at 35.
176. Steyn, supra note 15, at 8.
177. Murphy, supra note 172, at 79.
178. See R. Civ. Pro. of 1998.
179. Id. at 32.1.
180. Id at 32.2. In Great Future Intl Ltd. v. Sealand Housing Corp., the court stated that the power to exclude
evidence in the exercise of case management must be used with great circumspection. Great Future Int'l Ltd.
v. Sealand Housing Corp., [2004] EWHC 124.
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V. Conclusion
Interpretation is integral to contract law. It is thus unsurprising that the admissibility of
prior contractual negotiations has generated passionate debate among academics, jurists,
and practitioners. Despite the debate, the House of Lords in Chartbrook unwaveringly
defended their earlier stance that courts should not admit this category of evidence when
construing contracts. Though the rule has a long history on the precedential pedestal, it is
indisputable that the Supreme Court has the power to change the law, and it has done so
in the past. For example, the Lords changed the rule granting immunity to legal practi-
tioners from client suits,' 8 ' introduced foreseeability into the strict liability tort in Rylands
v. Fletcher,182 and in Pepper v. Hart changed the rule that prevented the use of Parliamen-
tary Hansard as a statutory interpretation aid.183 More recently, the Lords have relaxed
the rule of causation in cases like Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd.'18 and Chester
v. Afshar.85 These cases demonstrate that if a rule is impeding the development of the
law or inflicting pain and injustice, the courts will not hesitate to change it.186
Yet the House of Lords has shown a remarkable reluctance to adopt a modern approach
to the exclusionary rule even though the status quo has led occasionally to an undesirable
end. Apart from the rule's supposedly long pedigree, justification has been based on the
limited value that such evidence holds and the need to preserve certainty and contain
costs. However, as discussed, these justifications conceal another important reason for the
rule's retention-Lord Hoffmann's fidelity to his earlier interpretations on related mat-
ters. This paper further observed that the rule runs counter to those adopted in interna-
tional documents and many other jurisdictions, and is already punctured by a large
number of exceptions and qualifications at the domestic level, leaving its boundaries cur-
rently uncertain.187
This paper argued that where appropriate, the exclusionary rule can and should be
waived or set aside. This approach includes circumstances where consensus ad idem is
reached prior to the execution of the final agreement, where the term in contention is a
custom of the trade or a term of art, where the parties agreed to the specific meaning of
the term in dispute, and where the relevant information is electronically stored or availa-
ble. Most importantly, the paper argued that courts should admit extrinsic evidence based
on its relevance and weight within the parameters set by the Civil Procedure Rules of
1998.
This paper concludes by concurring with Lord Justice May in his lead judgment in
McPhilemy v. Times Newspapers Ltd. that a judge's power to manage cases:
181. See Rondel v. Worsisey, [1967] 1 A.C. 191, 196 (H.L.) (U.K); see also Arthur J.S. Hall & Co. v. Sim-
mons, [20021 1 A.C. 615, 615 (H.L.) (U.K.).
182. Cambridge Waterworks Ltd. v. E. Counties Leather Plc., [1994] 2 A.C. 264 (H.L.) (U.K).
183. Pepper v. Hart, [1993) A.C. 593, [1992] UKHL 3 (on appeal from Eng.) (U.K.).
184. Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Servs. Ltd., 12003] 1 A.C. 32, [2002] UKHL 22 (H.L.) (U.K.).
185. Chester v. Afshar, [2005] 1 A.C. 134, [2004] UKHL 41 (H.L.) (U.K.).
186. See 1966 Practice Statement [1966] 3 All E.R. 777; see also NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND
AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 111-31 (2008).
187. JACK BEATSON, ANSON'S LAW OF CONTRACT 132 (28th ed. 2002); Davies, supra note 112, at
127.
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includes excluding all peripheral material which is not essential to the just determina-
tion of the real issues between the parties, and whose examination would be dispro-
portionate to its importance to those issues. It does not, [however], extend to
excluding potentially important evidence which is central to a legitimate substantial
defence.1ss
That statement aligns with the celebrated U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frank-
furter's view that "if the purpose of construction is the ascertainment of meaning, nothing
that is logically relevant should be excluded."189
188. McPhilmey v. Times Newspaper Ltd., [1999] 3 All E.R. 775, 791. Arden LJ took a similar position in
Static Control Components (Europe) Ltd. v. Egan when she said, "I am not aware that the fears expressed as to
the opening of the floodgates have been realised. The powers of case management in the civil procedure
rules could . . . be used to keep evidence within its proper bounds." Static Control Components (Europe)
Ltd. v. Egan, [2004] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 429, 435.
189. Frankfurter, supra note 37, at 527.
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